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CBOsswmTE v.

AMERICAN INSURANCE

Co.

[61 C.2d

[So F. No. 21632. In Bank. May 14, 1964.]

IJOUIS CROSSWHITE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. THE
AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant and
Respondent.
[la, Ib] Cla.im and Delivery-Liability on Undertaking.-In an
action against a surety company on a claim and delivery bond,
based on the breach by the plaintiff in the action in which the
bond was furnished of a condition in the bond that the action
would be prosecuted, the present plaintiff could not recover
damages other than the costs of the first action wh£'re he had
no right to the possession of the property during the time it
was kept from him by virtue of the claim and dt'livery procedure.
[2] ld. - Liability on Undertaking - Evidence. - In an action
against a surety company on a claim and delivery bond, neither
the voluntary dismissal without prejudice of the claim and
delivery action nor the court's order to return the mortgaged
property to plaintiff because thc seizure was irregular conclusively established plaintiff's right to possess the property during the timc it was kept from him.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Humboldt County. Donald H. Wilkinson, Judge. Affirmed.
Action to recover on a claim and delivery bond. Judgment
for defendant surety company affirmed.
Jones & Sinai and James E. Jones, Jr., for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
Frederick L. Hilger for Defendant and Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiff appeals from a judgment for
defendant surety company in an action on a claim and deliverybond.
Plaintiff acquired a logging truck knowing that it was sub··
ject to a chattel mortgage held by the DeBon Motor Company
as security for a note that was in default. The mortgage
provided that in the event of a default the mortgagee was

.1

J

[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Claim and DeIiv£'ry, § 79; Am.Jur., Replevin
(1st cd § 149).
McK. Dig, References: [1] Claim lind Delivery, § 88; [2J Claim
and Delivery, § 95.
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entitled to possession and could "enter upon the premises
where the said mortgaged property may be and take possessiOll thereof." Instead of attempting to take possession of
the truck, DeBon first demanded possession and when that
was refused brought an action against the mortgagor to
recover the truck and also invoked the auxiliary J'emedy of
claim and delivery. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 509-521.) Defendant
delivered to DeBon the undertaking required to support the
seizure of the truck by claim and delivery. At that time
DeBon did not know that the mortgagor had sold the truck
(the registration and certificate of ownership were not
transferred) or that the truck had been taken out of the
county where the mortgagor had his place of business.
Apparently for this reason seizure of the truck was delayed,
and plaintiff filed an answer to the complaint 15 minutes
before the sheriff seized the truck. Section 509 of the Code· of
Civil Procedure provides· that in an action to recover personal property the plaintiff may claim delivery of it "at any
time before answer." The sheriff did not seize the truck
until after the answer was filed and failed to deliver all of
the documents required for a seizure by claim and delivery.
Two months later the trial court ordered the truck returned.
DeBon returned the truck and voluntarily dismissed the action without prejudice, apparently because it did not wish to
leave plaintiff in possession while waiting for the case to
come to trial. DeBon filed a new action shortly thereafter,
and delivery of the truck was properly claimed.
The undertaking given by defendant, following the provi- .
sions of section 512,· was conditioned on the "prosecution of
the action. " DeBon's failure to prosecute the action
breached this condition. (Mills v. Gleason, 21 Cal. 274, 280;
Bucy v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 150 Cal..App.2d 572,
574 [310 P.2d 189].) The only issue at the trial was the
amount of plaintiff's damage, which plaintiff claimed to be
the value of the use of the truck during the two-month period
when DeBon had possession of it. The trial court, however,
held that plaintiff had no right to the use of the truck during
that period and therefore had not been damaged by its seizure.
[1&] It is established by the admitted facts, and plaintiff
does not deny, that DeBon was entitled to the possession of
.Section 1112 requi~ ". written 11Ddertakillg, executed by two or
more eufIlcient sureties ••• to the effect that the)' are bo11Dd to the
defendant ill double the value of the property ••• for the proaeeution of
the action.... "
I
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the truck when it was seized. The truck was subject to a
mortgage securing an obligation that was in default. The
mortgage expressly granted the mortgagee the right to
possession afterdefauIt, and under its terms the mortgagee
could have repossessed the truck without legal process, at
least if the repossession could have been accomplished peacefully. (Silverstin v. Koh'ler ~ Chase, 181 Cal. 51, 54 [183 P.
451, 9 A.L.R. 1177]; Plinn v. Perry, 127 Cal. 648, 652-653
[60 P. 434]; Zef/ v.Harvey Smith Oldsmobile Co., 154
Cal.App.2d 1, 4 1315 P.2d 371]; see Harper v. Gordon, 128
Cal. 489, 491-492 [61 P. 84].) In withholding property
subject to such a mortgage after demand, the mortgagor and
his assigns became converters (Mathew v. Mathew, 138 Cal.
334, 336-337 [71 P. 344]). liable not only for the property or
its value, but also. for damages for the detention from the
time of the demand. (Guerin v. Kirst, 33 Ca1.2d 402, 414-415
[202 P.2d 10, 7 A.L.R.2d 922]; Spencer KenMUy, Ltd. v ..
Bank of America, 19 Cal.2d 586, 589 [122 P.2d 522] ; Drinkhouse v. Van Ness, 202 Cal. 359, 374, 379-380 [260 P. 869] ;
Na1thas v. Browning, 181 Cal. 55, 57 [183 P. 442, 6 A.L.R.
476]; Code Civ. Proc., §§ 667, 627; see Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 740; 10 CaI.Jur.2d, Claim and Delivery, § 70.) Plaintiff was
therefore not only not entitled to the use of the truck during
the two-month period it was in DeBon's possession, but could
have been held liable for the value of its use had he retained
it during that time. Unless defendant is precluded for some
reason from showing its principal's right to possession, the
trial court's decision must be affirmed.
[2] Plaintiff contends that the judgment of dismissal
conclusively established his right to possession. This contention is clearly without merit. A voluntary dismissal without
prejudice before trial is not a judgment on the merits. Nor
did the trial court's order to return the truck to plaintiff
establish his right to possession. That order was based merely
on the procedural irregularity in the seizure.
[Ib] Plaintiff contends that his right to possession is
irrelevant in an action on a claim and delivery bond. He
contends that because there was a breach of a condition of
the bond, he must necessarily have a right to recover
damages. That he would have had a right to recover the costs
of the first action', had he asked for them, is clear. To recover
more than costs, however, he must show some other injury.
DeBon's dismissal of the action precluded a determination
in that action of plaintiff's right to possession. Bad DeBon
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prosecuted the action and failed to establish its right to possession, plaintiff could have recovered damages for the loss of
use of the truck. The denial of that opportunity was the
wrong involved here. (Mills v. Gleason, 21 Cal. 274, 280;
Bucy v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 150 Cal.App.2d 572,
574 [310 P.2d 189].) That wrong was rectified by giving
plaintiff an opportunity to bring an action on the bond in
which, if defendant could not show DeBon's right to possession, plaintiff was guaranteed satisfaction of his judgment.
Plaintiff's recoYery on the bond is limited to the damages he
could have recovered had the original action been decided on
the merits in his favor. (Sec LeFave v. Dimond, 46 Ca1.2d
868, 870-871 [299 P.2d 858, 60 A.L.R.2d 939]; Nahhas v.
Browning, 181 Cal. 55, 57 [183 P. 442,6 A.L.R. 476].) Thus,
in Mills v. Gleason, 21 Cal. 274, 280, the court held that" A
dismissal stands upon the same footing as a nonsuit, leaving
the parties to settle in an action upon the undertaking those
matters which, if the original suit were prosecuted, it would
be necessary to determine in the first instance. SUCII matters
include, of course, the right of the defendant [in replevin] to
a return of the property, and as the opportunity to obtain a
judgment for its return is taken away by the failure to
prosecute, he is entitled to compensation in damages. A
failure to prosecute is a breach of the undertaking, and the
legal and necessary result is that the sureties to the undertaking are liable for whatever injury the defendant has
sustained." In Tapscott v. Lyon, 103 Cal. 297, 310 [37 P.
225], a replevisor who dismissed his action after ch~iming
delivery of the property was held liable for damages only if
he failed to establish his right to the property. Though tlle
plaintiff in tbat case sued in conversion rather than on the
bond, the basis for liability in either case is the same, and the
court treated the remedies as interchangeable. In Bucy v.
New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 150 Cal.App.2d 572, 574-575
{310 P.2d 189], the court affirmed a judgment for the
plaintiff in an action on a claim and delivery bond after
deciding that the evidence supported the trial court's finding
that plaintiff was entitled to possession of the property
taken. These decisions are supported by the weight of authority. (Meyers v. CJ.T. Corp. (1945) 132 Conn. 284 {43 A.2d
742, 744] ; Holcombe ct Hoke Mfg. Co. v. Watts (1930) 91
Ind.App. 695 [170 N.E. 861, 861-862]; Wyatt v. Duncan
(1939) ]49 Kan. 244 [87 P.2d 233, 238]; Rowan v. State
. (1937) 172 Md. 190 [191 A. 244, 249] ; Macomber v. Moor
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----------------------------------------(1930) 128 Me. 481 [148A. 682, 684]; McCleUan v.1!'.A.
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North Co. (1937) 118 N.J.L. 168 [191 A; 753, 754] ; Budracco \'
v. National Surety Co. (1920) 112 Misc. 133 [182 N.Y.S. 590, . .
595]; Davis Bros. Co. v. waZZace (1925) 190 N.C. 543[130
S.E. 176, 179-180] ; Bates v. American Surety Co. (1929) 50
R.I. 402 [148 A. 323] ; see Hoebel v. Utah-Idaho Live Stock
Loan Co. (1924) 39 Idaho 294 [227P. 1048, 1049-1050]; i
Maynard v. Bank of Kershaw 188 S.C. 160 [198S.E. 188,
192-1931 ; Cobbey, Replevin (2d ed. 1900) §§ 1355, 1356, 1369, \
1370; Wells, Replevin (2d ed. 1907) §§ 448, 457,458.)
Shockley v. General Casualty Co., 194 Cal.App.2d 107 [14
Cal.Rptr. 789], which plaintiff invokes, is not relevant. It
involved an action on an attachment bond, not a claim and
delivery bond, and the court did not consider whether the
defendant could assert its principal's right to possession of
the attached property as a defense to the action.
Since plainti1I had no right to the use of the truck when
DeBon took it, damages based on the value of its use could
not be justified as being compensatory. Nor has plainti1I
alleged or proved any facts justifying a penalty. There was
no forcible seizure, which, by analogy to the rules applicable
to the forcible entry and detainer of real property (Code Civ.
Proc., §§ 1159, 1160, 1174, 735; see Jordan v. Talbot, 55'\
Cal.2d 597 [12 Cal.Rptr. 488, 361 P.2d 20]), might justify
.penalizing defendant. There is no suggestion of malice (ct.
Metzenbaum v. Metzenbaum, 121 Ca1.App.2d 64 [262 P.2d
596] ; see McCormick, Damages (1935) § 110) or of abuse of
process. (Cf. Bille v. Manning, 94 Cal.App.2d 142 [210 P.2d
254]; see McCormick, supra, § 109.)
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobrinet,

J., and Peek, J., concurred.
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